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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Raymond Stuart Neinburg appeals from the sentence and restitution order 
imposed upon his conviction for driving under the influence as a persistent violator. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Nienburg, while intoxicated, drove through the Pizza Hut drive-through, 
demanding to be served a pizza. (PSl 1, pp.89-90.) Pizza Hut staff, noting Nienburg's 
apparent intoxication and watching as he drank from an open bottle of vodka, reported 
Nienburg to the police. (Id.) When Nienburg saw them calling the police, he sped away 
from the Pizza Hut, driving erratically through the parking lot and burning rubber. (Id.) 
Soon thereafter, Nienburg returned and pounded on the Pizza Hut's front door, then left 
again to go home. (Id.) 
Officer Cook was dispatched to investigate. (PSI, pp.76-81.) En route, Officer 
Cook learned that the registration on Nienburg's vehicle had been cancelled. (Id.) 
Officer Cook located Nienburg as Nienburg was driving down Ustick toward a trailer 
park. (Id.) Officer Cook attempted to enforce a traffic stop, but Nienburg gave no heed. 
(Id.) As Nienburg pulled into ~1is driveway, Officer Cook shouted, "Stop! Police!" but 
Nienburg fled, attempting to jump the fence into his backyard. (Id.) Officer Cook called 
for backup and then pursued Nienburg, apprehending Nienburg before he made it over 
the fence. (Id.) Nienburg tried to fight off the officer, tearing Officer Cook's pant leg in 
1 The Presentence Investigation Report is attached to the record as an electronic 
exhibit. Citations to the PSI reflect the electronically stamped pagination numbers that 
run throughout the exhibit, which do not correspond to the page numbers of the 
individual documents. 
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the scuffle. (Id.) Nienburg later admitted that he fled because he had active warrants 
for his arrest. (Id.) Placed under arrest for driving under the influence, Nienburg was 
taken to the county jail for BAG testing where he blew a .247 and .235. (Id.) Nienburg's 
German shepherd, left unsecured in his truck when Nienburg attempted to flee police, 
rushed out into the street where it collided with the backup patrol vehicle en route to the 
scene, resulting in the dog's death and moderate damage to the cruiser. (Id.) 
The State charged Nienburg with felony driving under the influence, driving 
without privileges, resisting arrest, and an additional persistent violator enhancement. 
(R., pp.28-30, 44-46.) Nienburg and prosecutors negotiated a plea agreement wherein 
Nienburg would plead guilty to the felony driving under the influence and the persistent 
violator enhancement, the State would dismiss the remaining counts and recommend a 
unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed, allowing the defendant to argue for 
less time, and Nienburg agreed to pay restitution not to exceed $1,156.98. (R., pp.56-
63; see also Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.6, L.19.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State 
submitted a restitution order for $1,156.98. (R., pp.67-68.) Restitution included $68.00 
for the police pants and $1,088.98 for the cost of repairing the damage to the cruiser. 
(Id.; see also PSI, pp.64-70.) 
The district court entered judgment of conviction, sentencing Nienburg to 15 
years with four years fixed and ordering $1,156.98 in restitution, among other fees and 
fines. (R., pp.67-72.) Nienburg filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.76-78.) 
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ISSUES 
Nienburg states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court exceed its statutory authority when it ordered 
Mr. Nienburg to pay for the damage to the police cruiser, which was not 
the result of his criminal conduct? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Nienburg 
following his plea of guilty to felony driving under the influence with a 
persistent violator enhancement? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Nienburg failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when 
it ordered Nienburg to pay the $1,156.98 in restitution he agreed to pay pursuant to his 
plea agreement for losses sustained by the State as a result of his criminal conduct? 
2. Has Nienburg failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion in imposing a unified term of 15 years with four years fixed upon Nienburg's 




Nienburg Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, 
Consistent With The Plea Agreement. It Ordered Nienburg To Pay Restitution For 
Losses Arising From Dismissed Criminal Conduct 
A. Introduction 
Nienburg contends that the district court's determination that he consented to pay 
restitution pursuant to his plea agreement was legally wrong. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
13.) Nienburg's argument is without merit. The plea agreement unambiguously 
required Nienburg to pay restitution not to exceed $1,156.98. Even if the amount of 
restitution was ambiguous, the requirement that Nienburg pay some restitution for the 
damages to Officer Cook's pants and the patrol vehicle was not. During the sentencing 
hearing the district court clarified that the plea agreement required Nienburg to pay 
$1,156.98 for the damages caused by his criminal conduct, and Nienburg 
acknowledged and accepted the plea agreement with that understanding. The district 
court's restitution order should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, whether to order restitution, and in what amount, are matters to be 
determined within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 
43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002). Interpretation of a plea agreement is governed by 
contract law standards. State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995); State 
v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Whether a contract 
is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed de nova. State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 
785, 918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 1996). The interpretation and legal effect of a clear 
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and unambiguous plea agreement are matters of law reviewed de nova. State v. 
Barnett, 133 Idaho 231,234,985 P.2d 111,114 (1999). However, the interpretation of 
ambiguous language in an qgreement presents a question of fact. Id. "Such 
interpretations require a trier of fact to discern the intent of the contracting parties, 
generally by considering the objective and purpose of the provision and the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement." State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 
267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006). Appellate courts will defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 
682, 686, 991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 1999). "Findings are clearly erroneous only 
when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." kt 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That Nienburg Agreed To Pay Restitution In 
The Amount Of $1,156.98 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(9) provides that "[t]he court may, with the consent of the 
parties, order restitution to victims, and/or any other person or entity, for economic loss 
or injury for crimes which are not adjudicated or are not before the court." I.C. § 19-
5304(9). In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement entered into by Neinburg 
and prosecutors, the district court ordered Nienburg to pay $1,156.98 in restitution 
arising from criminal charges which the State had dismissed. (R., pp.69-72; Tr., p.25, 
Ls.20-24.) Contrary to Nienburg's assertions on appeal, Nienburg unambiguously 
agreed to pay $1,156.98 in restitution. 
Nienburg was originally charged with felony driving under the influence, driving 
without privileges, and resisting arrest. (R., pp.28-30.) In exchange for Nienburg's 
guilty plea to the felony DUI and an additional persistent violator enhancement, the 
5 
State agreed to dismiss the remaining criminal charges. (R., pp.56-63; Tr., p.5, L.9 -
p.6, L.19.) As part of that agreement, Nienburg was required to pay restitution on the 
damages which arose from the dismissed charge of resisting arrest, not to exceed 
$1,156.98. (Id.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court ensured that all the parties had the 
same understanding of the plea agreement. (See Tr., pp.17-24.) The district court 
briefly rehearsed the terms of the agreement, including that Nienburg agreed to pay 
restitution, and that the amount was approximately $1,156.98, although Nienburg was 
"free to argue for less." (Tr., p.17, L.4 - P.18, L.12.) The State presented its proposed 
restitution order for $1, 156.98, the figure previously mentioned by the district court. (Tr., 
p.18, Ls.13-15.) The district court asked if Nienburg was "willing to pay that restitution 
amount." (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-17.) Nienburg's counsel agreed that paying restitution was 
"certainly part of the plea agreement," but asked the district court to consider not 
ordering restitution for the damages done to the police cruiser. (Tr., p.18, L.18 - p.19, 
L.3.) The district court responded: 
He agreed - he agreed that he would pay that restitution. I'm sorry. That 
was part of the discussion. And we even - they even talked about the 
amount. 
So if he wants to violate the plea agreement, then the plea agreement's 
gone and the state's free to argue for imposition of up to life. 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.4-11.) Nienburg's counsel responded that "he definitely [did not] want to 
violate the plea agreement." (Tr., p.19, Ls.12-13.) The district court continued, 
Well, as I understand the plea agreement, he agreed to pay that restitution 
and the amount was actually stated as part of that. 
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So if he doesn't want to pay the restitution, we can - then in my view he's 
violating the plea agreement. 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.14-19.) 
The district court then requested the parties' positions on the restitution issue. 
(Tr., p.19, L.20; p.20, Ls.10-11.) The State responded that, through documented email 
exchanges, "that figure ha[d] certainly been discussed," that the State was clearly 
seeking restitution for the damqge to the police cruiser, and that "Nienburg has already 
agreed that that is part of the plea agreement." (Tr., p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.9.) Nienburg 
responded that the damages to the cruiser were caused by his dog, not directly by him, 
and would not have occurred if the officers had not been there. (Tr., p.20, L.12 - p.21, 
L.17.) The district court countered, "It wouldn't have happened but for your client 
running from the scene and leaving the door open and having been driving under the 
influence." (Tr., p.21, Ls.18-21.) The district court went on to explain that, if restitution 
was part of his plea agreement, Nienburg could not argue that he was not responsible 
for those damqges. (Tr., p.22, Ls.3-12.) The district court continued: 
If it's part of the plea agreement, and that's the way it was stated when it 
was read at the time that I heard it, then if he wants to back out, then he 
doesn't have a plea agreement. He can't have it both ways. It's a 
contract. 
(Tr., p.22, Ls.16-21.) Nienburg's counsel agreed, stating that "the bottom line [was thar 
Nienburg was] willing to pay restitution and if he's ordered that, he'll do that," because 
he did not want to evade the plea agreement. (Tr., p.22, L.22 - p.23, L.8.) 
The dialogue continued: 
THE COURT: Well, it says here as a result of the plea in your case, have 
you been advised that you may be required to pay restitution to any victim 
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in this case pursuant to 19-5304. He said yes. If yes, to whom. He wrote 
Ada County. 
MR. LO .. IEK: Okay. All right. Looks like it's part of the plea agreement. 
MS. DUNN: And, Your Honor, I did just provide counsel with some of the 
e-mail train with Miss Buttram where she is clearly indicating that the 
whole amount is part of the package. 
THE COURT: That's what I wrote down and that's what my clerk wrote 
down, that that's what the agreement was. It says - in fact, you stated - I 
have it here in the minutes, you said he'd plead guilty to Count One, guilty 
to the Info Part II, 15, four plus eleven, and he would pay restitution not to 
exceed $1,156.98. That's you, Mr. Lojek, saying it. 
So either it's part of the plea agreement - and if it is, and it seems to me it 
is, then if he wants to back out -
MR. LOJEK: He doesn't want to back out, Your Honor. He'll stand by his 
plea. 
THE COURT: He'll stand by the plea agreement? 
MR. LOJEK: Yes. 
(Tr., p.23, L.9 - p.24, L.10.) The district court then went on to order the $1,156.98 in 
restitution. (Tr., p.25, Ls.20-21.) 
On appeal, Nienburg argues that the phrase "not to exceed" in the plea 
agreement allows him to renege on his promise to pay restitution by arguing that he was 
not the cause of the damages sought in restitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-13.) 
Nienburg's argument is wholly contrary to law: Where a defendant has agreed to pay 
restitution, the State has no burden to prove the defendant's culpability, but need only 
show the value of the economic loss by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-
5304(6), (9); see also State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 373-74, 161 P.3d 689, 692-93 
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(Ct. App. 2007). Nienburg unambiguously agreed to pay restitution. (R., pp.56-63.) As 
clarified by the district court, that restitution included damages both to Officer Cook's 
pants and to the police cruiser. (See Tr., pp.17-24, discussed supra.) At most, the 
language "not to exceed" would allow Nienburg to challenge the dollar amount on the 
restitution requested by the State, arguing, for instance, that the pants cost less than 
$68.00 or that repairs for the damages to the police cruiser cost less than $1,088.98. 
Nienburg did not raise any such argument below, nor does he make one on appeal. 
The only argument Nienburg raises is that he be totally absolved from paying any 
restitution on the police cruiser, an argument unambiguously foreclosed by the parties' 
plea agreement and the district court's clarification of that plea agreement. 
Taken in the context of the plea agreement, the $1,156.98 figure clearly shows 
that the parties contemplated restitution for both the damages to the officer's pants and 
the police cruiser. By the time prosecutors and Nienburg entered into the plea 
agreement on February 5, 2011, the State had already established that Nienburg owed 
at least $1,156.98 in restitution on the charge of resisting arrest. (See PSI, pp.64-70.) 
That sum was reached by adding the known losses of $68.00 for the pants (PSI, p.65) 
and the known losses of $1,088.98 for the damages to the police cruiser (PSI, pp.66-
70.) As noted by the Boise City Attorney's Office, that $1,088.98 represented the "costs 
presently paid" to repair the cruiser on the "total damages to date." (PSI, p.66.) It was 
possible that there were still additional costs and damages that would be discovered 
going forward, but as consideration for the plea agreement, the State limited restitution 
to those damages already known when the agreement was entered. As correctly noted 
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by Nienburg on appeal, the plea agreement only provided a cap on any future 
restitution. (Appellant's brief, p.13 n.6.) 
Even if the unambiguous plea agreement did not foreclose Nienburg's causation 
argument, he has still failed to show that his criminal conduct of resisting arrest did not 
cause the damages sought in restitution. On appeal, Nienburg essentially argues that 
the damages caused to the police cruiser were not his fault; they were his dog's fault. 
Therefore, he should not be required to pay restitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9). 
Nienburg's argument that his dog represents an intervening cause is entirely without 
merit. Nienburg negligently released his German shepherd into the highway while 
resisting arrest by unlawfully fleeing police, and is therefore liable for the damages his 
dog caused when it collided with the police cruiser that was lawfully at the scene. See 
McLain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, 1016 
(1909) ("Where a dog invades and trespasses upon the legal rights of a person and 
injures person or property, and such invasion and trespass is the result of the 
negligence of the owner, the owner of such dog is liable for the damages done."). A 
dog's reaction to being startled does not constitute an intervening or superseding cause. 
See Isham v. Dow's Estate, 41 A. 585 (Vt. 1898). Regardless, because Neinburg 
agreed to pay that restitution, the State has no burden to prove his culpability, but need 
only show the value of the economic loss by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 
19-5304(6), (9); Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373-74, 161 P.3d at 692-93. 
In this case, Nienburg's fleeing from Officer Cook's lawful demands for him to 
stop, and then wrestling with Officer Cook as the officer forcibly placed Nienburg under 
arrest, caused $68.00 worth of damages to Officer Cook's pants. (PSI, p.65.) When 
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Nienburg resisted arrest by fleeing his truck on foot, he left his truck door open, allowing 
his large German shepherd to escape into the street where it collided with the cruiser, 
causing at least $1,088.98 in damages. (PSI, pp.66-70.) Thus, Nienburg's criminal act 
of resisting arrest led to damages totaling at least $1,156.98, both through Nienburg's 
intentional act of scuffling with Officer Cook and ~1is negligent act of releasing his dog 
into the highway while unlawfully fleeing from police. The district court correctly found 
that Nienburg agreed to pay restitution, and correctly ordered $1,156.98 in restitution. 
Nienburg has failed to show clear error in the district court's factual findings or an abuse 
of discretion in the amount of restitution ordered by the district court. The judgment of 
the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
11. 
Nienburg Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
Nienburg asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and 
executed a unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed following his felony driving 
under the influence conviction with a persistent violator enhancement, arguing that the 
district court only considered two sentencing factors and failed to give sufficient weight 
to allegedly mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.) Contrary to Nienburg's 
assertions, the district court properly considered all of the appropriate factors when it 
crafted Nienburg's sentence. Nienburg has failed to establish an abuse of the district 
court's sentencing discretion. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
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carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed 
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. 
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, 
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568,650 P.2d at 710. 
Both the nature of the crime and Nienburg's character as a repeat offender 
support the sentence imposed. In the present crime, Nienburg admitted to drinking 
several fruit punch and cranberry flavored Mike's Hard Lemonades. (PSI, pp.7-8.) He 
then drove himself out to Pizza Hut. At Pizza Hut, he came through the drive-through 
and demanded a pizza. (PSI, pp.89-90.) While watching Nienburg drink from an open 
vodka bottle in his vehicle, the staff called police and reported what they saw, that 
Nienburg smelled strongly of alcohol, and that his breath also smelled "somewhat 
fruity." (Id.) When Neinburg realized what they were doing, he fled, driving erratically 
through the parking lot. (Id.) He later returned to pound on the Pizza Hut's front doors 
before going back home. (Id.) 
Dispatched to the scene, Officer Cook learned while en route that Nienburg's 
vehicle's registration had been cancelled. (PSI, pp.76-81.) Officer Cook located 
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Nienburg and, with his lights flashing, followed Neinburg all the way into the driveway of 
Neinburg's trailer house. (Id.) Officer Cook shouted at Neinburg to, "Stop! Police!" but 
Nienburg attempted to flee the scene. (Id.) Officer Cook called for assistance and 
pursued Nienburg. (Id.) Officer Cook apprehended Nienburg as Neinburg attempted to 
jump over a gate. (Id.) Neinburg scuffled with Officer Cook, trying to escape until the 
officer threatened to "taze" him. (Id.) Nienburg admitted to Officer Cook that he 
attempted to flee because he had active warrants for his arrest. (Id.) Placed under 
arrest for driving under the influence, Neinburg was transported to the county jail for 
BAC testing where he blew a .247 and .235. (Id.) 
Nienburg has a lengthy history of driving under the influence. He received his 
first DUI while in Washington in 1994 (PSI, p.8), he got another while in Oregon in 
January, 1996 (id.), a third while in Idaho in August, 1996 (PSI, p.9), a fourth in July, 
2000 (id.), and a fifth the very next month (id.); his first felony DUI came in April, 2002 
(PSI, p.10), and his second in July, 2002 (id.). T~1is is Nienburg's third felony DUI and 
eighth DUI overall. Nienburg has had multiple opportunities to stop driving under the 
influence, yet consistently chooses to drive while intoxicated. 
And Nienburg's criminal history, encompassing the past two decades, is not 
limited to DUl's. Additionally, Nienburg has been charged with many felonies and 
misdemeanors, including burglary, assault, trespass, failure to comply, domestic 
battery, battery, resisting arrest, failure to give notice of accident, possession of 
paraphernalia, driving without privileges, providing false information, failure to provide 
insurance, multiple probation and parole violations, and several failures to appear. 
(PSI, pp.8-11.) Nienburg's criminal history, especially his pattern of resisting arrest and 
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several failures to appear, displays an utter disregard for the law and an aversion to 
taking personal responsibility for his criminal actions. 
Nienburg argues that the district court failed to properly consider all of the Toohill 
sentencing objectives of protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution 
when crafting its sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) This argument is flatly 
contradicted by the district court at the sentencing hearing. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.12-17, "in 
an exercise of discretion in sentencing, I have considered the Toohill factors.") Besides, 
"[t]he primary consideration [in crafting a reasonable sentence] is ... the good order and 
protection of society. All other factors are, and must be, subservient to that end." State 
v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1003 (1956), ellipses original). The sentence imposed 
by the district court answers the primary consideration of protecting society, while also 
addressing the other salient sentencing factors in this case. Neinburg has failed to 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Nienburg further argues that his history of alcohol abuse and currently professed 
willingness to undergo treatment should have been weighed as stronger mitigating 
factors. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) This argument is unavailing. A history of alcohol 
abuse is not a mitigating factor in relation to a crime which requires not only the 
repeated abuse of alcohol, but driving while abusing alcohol. See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 
727, 170 P.3d at 392. It is even less availing in Nienburg's case where, as noted by the 
district court, he already professed a willingness to change and undergo treatment, but 
did not do it. (Tr., p.38, Ls.14-25; see also PSI, pp.104, 121. 
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Nienburg also argues that the support of family and friends should result in a 
more lenient sentence. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Nienburg's argument, however, does 
not change the fact that despite such support in the past, Nienburg still repeatedly 
chose to drink and drive. Because the support of family members has yet to protect the 
community from Nienburg's driving under the influence, Nienburg has failed to show 
that the district court was required to conclude that it somehow would this time. 
The district court addressed the relevant factors to be considered at the 
sentencing hearing and exercised its discretion in imposing a reasonable sentence. 
Nienburg has failed to establish any abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
awarding restitution in the amount of $1,156.98, and affirm Nienburg's sentence. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 2011. 
~u~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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